China announces the US’s Spratly patrols to the masses
Posted: October 27, 2015 Filed under: China-US, State media, TV | Tags: CCTV, China-US relations, Chinese foreign policy, Chinese media, Chinese nationalism, Chinese public opinion, freedom of navigation, freedom of navigation patrols, nationalism, PRC foreign policy, public opinion, south china sea, US-China relations, Xinwen Lianbo, 新闻联播 8 Comments
“If any countries have delusions of using small actions to interfere with or even obstruct the Chinese side’s reasonable, fair and legal activities on its own territory, then I must urge those countries to abandon those fantasies as soon as possible.” – MFA spokesman Lu Kang, October 27, 2015 (click to view video on CCTV).
The US early this morning (Beijing time) finally followed through with its plan to patrol within 12nm of at least one of the PRC’s artificial islands, and China has just announced the developments to the whole country via CCTV’s 7pm news broadcast.
The 7pm news program Xinwen Lianbo 新闻联播 is both the most-watched and most tightly-controlled news broadcast in the country. Whatever appears there can reliably be understood to be there for primarily political reasons, rather than due to professional media “news values” or sensationalism. What makes Xinwen Lianbo a unique source of insight compared with other media carrying authoritative content, such as the People’s Daily or Liberation Army Daily, is that while the official press’s readership is mostly limited to elites and the attentive public, Xinwen Lianbo is watched by perhaps 50 to 100 million or more ordinary people. In short, it carries the Party Line to the masses.
Although Xinwen Lianbo’s presentation style has evolved slightly in the 2000s, content-wise the bulletins are still dominated by detailed narrations of the top leaders’ meetings with international dignitaries and each other, updates on the ever-successful rollout of party policies and campaigns, paeans to model citizens and, last of all, a few general news reports, usually very brief. Foreign affairs controversies like the South China Sea dispute are rarely mentioned — when they are, it is usually in the context of leaders’ anodyne remarks about appropriately handling differences and jointly upholding stability in meetings with their counterparts from rival claimant states, most commonly Vietnam.
Mentions of specific developments in disputed areas are rarer still — even when they cast the party in a positive light from a hardline nationalist perspective. To take one topical example, China’s massive island-building activities began in early 2014 and were widely reported in foreign media from around June last year, but they only received their first mention on Xinwen Lianbo on June 16 this year. Evidently, the leadership normally prefers to handle these issues without encouraging scrutiny from the broad masses. This is why it is meaningful when contentious developments and confrontational rhetoric, such as that surrounding the US patrols, rate a mention.
At 1 minute 40 seconds, this Xinwen Lianbo report was quite lengthy compared with other South China Sea stories. Here it is in translation:
CCTV host: Today, the US warship Lassen, without permission from the Chinese government, illegally entered waters adjacent to China’s relevant islands and reefs in the Spratly archipelago. Regarding this, China expressed strong dissatisfaction and resolute opposition, and urged the American side to immediately rectify its mistakes.
CCTV voiceover: Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, when asked during the China-Japan-Korea symposium today, advised the US side to think thrice before acting, and not be rash or make trouble. In this afternoon’s daily press briefing, MFA spokesperson Lu Kang reiterated, China has indisputable sovereignty over the Spratly Islands and their nearby waters.
Lu Kang: If any countries have delusions of using small actions to interfere with or even obstruct the Chinese side’s reasonable, fair and legal activities on its own territory, then I must urge those countries to abandon those fantasies as soon as possible.
CCTV voiceover: Lu Kang said the Chinese side has always respected and defended the freedom of navigation and overflight enjoyed by every country in the South China Sea under international law, but firmly opposes any country harming China’s sovereignty and security interests in the name of [Freedom of Navigation].
Lu Kang: The Chinese side resolutely defends its own territorial sovereignty, security and its legitimate and reasonable maritime rights and interests. China will firmly respond to any country’s deliberate provocation. We will continue to closely monitor the situation in the air and on the water, and adopt all necessary measures as needed.
CCTV voiceover: Lu Kang said the Chinese side strongly urges the American side to earnestly take heed of the Chinese side’s solemn representations, immediately correct its mistakes, not engage in any dangerous and provocative behaviour that threatens China’s sovereignty and security interests, and strictly abide by its commitments not to take a position on sovereignty disputes, in order to avoid further damaging Sino-American relations and regional peace and stability.
A Xinwen Lianbo report like this not only directly announces the party line to a massive audience, it also legitimizes other media to focus on the issue. As far as i can tell, this must reflect the propaganda authorities’ understanding that the party leadership wants the issue near the top of the broad public’s agenda, at least in the short term. If this assumption is sound (and please let me know if you disagree), the next question is why.
I’ve been watching the Chinese media treatment of the issue over the past 2-3 weeks, and will try to put together something more comprehensive together when we see how this plays out, but for now i’ll just try to point out a few features of the CCTV report’s content.
1. The CCP has chosen to make this an issue of sovereignty. Graham Webster noted recently in the US-China Week newsletter, China has carefully maintained ambiguity regarding its claims around the Spratly Islands and reefs. In particular, it has not explicitly stated which reefs it considers to be surrounded by 12nm territorial seas 领海. That deliberate ambiguity is continuing, as reflected in the term “adjacent waters 邻近海域” in the PRC statements today (see above). Subi Reef, where the US Navy patrolled today, is almost certainly not entitled to a (sovereign) territorial sea under international law, and as i argued in East Asia Forum last month, this actually makes the patrols less provocative than they might otherwise be. But five mentions of “sovereignty” in CCTV’s 100-second report makes clear that the PRC wants domestic discussion of the issue to be on these terms. The MFA spokesman mentioned “security interests,” “maritime rights and interests,” “provocation” and “dangerous behaviour” — the CCTV report could have focused on any of these complaints, but instead repeatedly emphasized “sovereignty,” a choice that is likely to capture everyday people’s attention and potentially inspire nationalist mobilization.
2. The lines about some countries’ “delusions” about obstructing China’s Spratly construction projects will allow the CCP to depict itself as bravely defying foreign pressure as it moves forward. The line appears to be primarily domestically oriented, given that it is missing from the MFA’s account of Lu Kang’s remarks on the topic. It sets up a kind of straw-man idea that the patrols are aimed at forcing China to stop its construction work on the artificial islands. Pushing this line to domestic audiences makes good sense, because it will frame any future updates about new Chinese facilities in the Spratlys as shows of unwavering determination in the face of US pressure.
3. The high-handed demand that the American side “correct its mistakes” leaves the CCP well positioned to claim that its stern response forced an aggressive hegemon to back down. At least one US official has described the patrols as “routine“, suggesting there will be more to come. Even if the US patrols happen, say, once a month from now on, it will be up to the CCP to decide how often Chinese mass audiences hear about this. Having established a high level of domestic publicity on this occasion, the CCP might well be able to (implicitly or explicitly) encourage the perception that it forced the US to back down, simply by not affording the same level of publicity to future FoN patrols.
So there are three speculative domestic rationales for the CCP’s decision to publicize the issue. A more internationally-oriented answer with plenty of explanatory purchase is the “strategic logic” of nationalist protest Jessica Chen Weiss outlined in her book Powerful Patriots and elsewhere. The theory focuses on the state’s decisions to allow or disallow anti-foreign street demonstrations, and who knows, those might be just around the corner…
I’d love to hear readers’ thoughts on what China going public like this means, so please leave a comment or get in touch.
Defining the “status quo” in the South China Sea
Posted: June 14, 2015 Filed under: Academic debates, China-ASEAN, China-Australia, China-Malaysia, China-Philippines, China-US, China-Vietnam, South China Sea | Tags: artificial islands, ASEAN, ASEAN and South China Sea, Ashton Carter, china maritime dispute, China-US relations, coercion, diplomacy, international norms, Malaysia, Malaysia and South china SEa, maritime disputes, reclamation, regional united front, Shangri-la Diaologue, south china sea, Spratly, spratly islands, status quo, The Diplomat, United States in South China Sea, 南海现状 9 Comments
Below is a piece published at The Diplomat, running through what the “status quo” is in the South China Sea, and the difficulties encountered in trying to define it. Aside from identifying some key metrics of the current situation in the disputed area, the aim was generate some debate, or at least second thoughts, about the usefulness of the “status quo” as a normative standard. The concept has proved useful in diplomacy over Taiwan, Korea and elsewhere, and (arguably) in international relations theory. But given the complex, watery nature of the South China Sea dispute, i argue it’s not likely to help in establishing the kind of clear-cut, universally recognized standards the region needs to forestall escalation there.
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The South China Sea: Defining the ‘Status Quo’
The term’s broad-brush vagueness – it simply means “the existing situation” – may make it appealing for practitioners of diplomacy, but the lack of clarity limits its usefulness as an analytic tool. More troublingly, being such an all-encompassing term, its use as a normative standard is inevitably selective, resulting in inconsistencies that risk breeding misunderstanding and mistrust. Unless used with care and nuance, it is a term that is more likely to undermine than underpin a “rules-based order” in maritime Asia.
The U.S. position on the East and South China Sea disputes, as Defense Secretary Ash Carter and other officials have frequently reiterated in recent months, is that it opposes changes to the status quo made through force or coercion. Senior U.S. military and civilian officials have used this standard formulation frequently since mid-2013, most prominently in relation to the PRC’s East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), and its well-publicized island-construction project in the South China Sea.
Claimants in the disputed seas have also embraced the idea of defending the status quo from Chinese advances. The leaders of Japan and the Philippines on June 4 affirmed their opposition to “unilateral attempts to changes the status quo.” Vietnam maintains a slightly subtler position that stops short of outright opposition, as typified by Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung’s call for countries to refrain from “actions that would complicate the situation and change the status quo of rocks and shoals.”
Can the US tone down to ASEAN’s tune?
Posted: May 27, 2014 Filed under: Academic debates, China-ASEAN, China-Australia, China-US, South China Sea | Tags: ASEAN, ASEAN and South China Sea, China-ASEAN, China-Australia relations, China-US relations, China-Vietnam, CNOOC, diplomacy, face, HYSY-981, peripheral diplomacy, public statements, regional united front, Sino-Vietnamese incidents, south china sea, US and South China Sea 4 Comments
Obama in Asia
East Asia Forum was yesterday kind enough to publish a piece called ‘Can the US tone down to ASEAN’s tune?’. I was asked to write about how the region should respond to crises like the Sino-Vietnamese standoff in the South China Sea, and the following is just my attempt at contributing something vaguely original to the discussion. I’m ready to be told it’s naive, silly or completely nuts; my only request is that if you think so, please say so!
As Bill Bishop suggested in the Sinocism Newsletter a couple of weeks back, the region at this point appears unable to impose costs on Beijing for the kind of escalatory conduct exemplified by its unilateral placement of the oil drilling rig HYSY-981 in disputed waters this month. This is definitely worth thinking long and hard about. We also need to consider the incentives that the international situation may be creating for this kind of assertiveness, and work to reduce these.
The following article’s bold proclamation about “what is needed” isn’t meant literally; although that wording suggests otherwise, i really am not claiming to know what is needed or tell the real experts that they don’t. It’s just a suggestion, a case to be made, which is based on:
- My reading of how China sees these issues and its strategic interests (relatively sensitive to the possibility of ASEANization of the issue, relatively insensitive to US grandstanding);
- What hasn’t worked to deter Beijing from assertive behaviour thus far (the US leading the criticism of China’s provocative actions and strengthening ties with China’s rival claimants); and
- Discussions with some friends and experts, whose feedback was vital to refining the idea (i’d name them but i’m not sure they wouldn’t prefer to remain nameless).
EAF allowed me a generous 1200-odd words, and i ought to thank the editors for their excellent job of compressing it. Nonetheless, a few other clarifications had to be left out for space reasons, so i’m adding them after the end of this post, mainly for my own benefit i imagine.
Anyway, here’s my crackpot idea, which which i put out there to be critiqued, so please don’t hold back . . .
Creative tensions and soft landings: Wang Yizhou explains China’s foreign policy agenda
Posted: December 17, 2013 Filed under: Academic debates, China's foreign relations, China-ASEAN, China-Japan, China-US | Tags: Carnegie-Tsinghua Center, China-Japan, China-North Korea relations, China-US relations, China-Vietnam, China-Vietnam relations, Chinese foreign policy, Chinese foreign policy scholars, Chinese strategy, creative tensions, 王逸舟, New kind of great power relations, north korea, Paul Haenle, peripheral diplomacy, PRC foreign policy, Sino-American relations, Sino-Japanese relations, Sino-Vietnamese relations, south china sea, Wang Yizhou, Xi Jinping foreign policy 4 Comments
Wang Yizhou 王逸舟
Peking University Professor Wang Yizhou, one of China’s top foreign policy scholars, did an interview for the excellent new Carnegie-Tsinghua podcast last month (Part 1 and Part 2), covering a very broad sweep of China’s emerging foreign policy, regional strategy, territorial disputes, global role, and bilateral relations with the US.
His main points are noted below, starting with regional strategy and China’s maritime territorial disputes. I’ve just done this as an exercise to try to better grasp the significance of what Wang says; for most people it’s probably better to just go listen to the podcast. The italicized blockquote bits are a mix of direct quotes and paraphrasing.
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Xi’s task: a “soft landing” for the South China Sea dispute
“Silent Contest”: Liu Yazhou’s warmed-over McCarthyism
Posted: November 4, 2013 Filed under: PLA & PLAN | Tags: China-US relations, Chinese army propaganda, 较量无声, Liu Yazhou, military propaganda, National Defense University, PLA General Political Department, PLA hardliners, PLA leaked video, US-China relations, 刘亚洲, 国防大学 3 CommentsThe latest “leaked” video from the PLA, and its subsequent deletion from the Mainland Chinese internet, has the western China watching community grasping for explanations. Leftist battle-cry ahead of a rightist Third Plenum? Harbinger of an assertive turn in China’s US policy? A glimpse of what the PLA really thinks? My humble addition to this motley list is: powerful statement of self-importance by the CCP-PLA propaganda apparatus?
The video itself is really quite a masterpiece in my view, produced by a master of political warfare, PLA National Defense University Political Commissar Liu Yazhou. It details how America is waging a smokeless war of “political genetic modification” against China, utilizing the permeation (渗透) and “peaceful evolution” strategy that brought down the Soviet Union.
“United States, the hope of humanity!” – Obama’s troops in Australia deal
Posted: November 17, 2011 Filed under: China-Australia, China-US, Comment threads, Global Times, PRC News Portals | Tags: Australia, China-Australia relations, China-US relations, Confucianism, da tong, Darwin, great community, great unity, Liu Weimin, Obama, US marines, US military, US overseas, 大同 1 Comment
While Obama’s every move prompts celebrity coverage from Australia’s media, it’s his announcement of increased US troop numbers that has captured attention in China.
The front page of the Global Times today is dominated by the headline, ‘Australia divided over American troops’, underneath which appears a Xinhua story about Australia’s “debate” over the American military increase. (I put debate in quotes because there has actually been remarkably little debate.)
Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Weimin has labelled the plan “inappropriate”, and all the major news portals – Sina, NetEase, Sohu, Phoenix and Tencent – are running this announcement prominently on their front pages. So far the volume of comments has not been huge, but aside from the obligatory condemning of the hapless Foreign Ministry spokesman, it seems to be bringing out China’s liberals, a group, or, more accurately, a strain of opinion, whose existence sometimes gets called into question when it comes to mass internet discussions.Normally such views are either “harmonized” by the censors or simply outnumbered and shouted down.
But here they are, these liberal views, dominating the comments on NetEase’s lead report, ‘China says US’s troop deployment in Australia inappropriate’. Or so it would appear…i should note that they are often accused of being paid by the US government, just as anyone who expresses agreement with or approval of the Chinese government tends to be denounced as a “fifty-center“.
The discussion is starting to take off (so far 1918 comments and 36,637 participants – the latter figure has increased by about 11,000 in the last couple of hours):
[問水 (“Ask Water”) – Guangzhou, Guangdong]: The United States, the hope of humanity! [5073 recommends]
In reply to “Ask Water” above – [铲除五1毛与美1狗 (“Eliminate fifty-centers and American dogs”) – Jinan, Shandong]: Hope is not blind worship. There must be clear acknowledgement of what race of person one is, and what races and suited to which systems. Stop dreaming, child
In reply to “Eliminate fifty-centers and American dogs” – [无毛的野爹 (“Hairless (/no-Mao) wild dad”) – Tangshan, Hebei]: At least he still has dreams. As for you, go back to your basket and gnaw on a bone. [4843]
[仇日者 (“Japan hater“) – Shenzhen, Guangdong]: The point is, what use is saying something is inappropriate??? Haha. It’s like a burly thug has parked his car so that it’s blocking the gate to your house. You hide, quivering, inside your house, saying “You’re blocking the driveway, it’s not appropriate” – is that any use??? If you had the capability, you’d go out and turn the car over! [3328 recommends]
In reply to “Eliminate fifty-centers and American dogs” – [shen0123 – Asia-Pacific region]: We should say that some races are suited to being people, and some races are suited to being swine. [2319]
. . .
[Liyulongmen – Beijing]: “Inappropriate”?? This is called interference in the US and Australia’s internal affairs. The Heavenly Kingdom would dispatch troops if it had the capability [1432]
In an illustration of how trends in public opinion shouldn’t automatically be seen as representing social groups (e.g. “pro-US liberals”), the US-Australia military announcement has also prompted expressions of a very mainstream envy of the American state’s strong pursuit of its own national interest, in contrast with the Chinese state’s constant stream of “protests”. This is apparent in the discussion on Phoenix’s current lead story, ‘Obama announces increase in US forces in Australia from next year’ so far has 361 comments and 17,385 participants:
[陈东czy – Datong, Shanxi]: Obama is a good official. He does practical things for the American people. I support. [4698 recommends]
[xangqumeiguo – Hubei]: I originally thought it was 2.5 million troops, not just 250, imperialism is a paper tiger. [1875]
In reply to “陈东czy” above [猪嗷 (“Sound of pigs”) – Shenzhen, Guangdong]: I can honestly tell you: 250 is enough! [916]
…
In reply to “陈东czy” above [XBQ2010 – Harbin, Heilongjiang]: A good official??? The people are national “occupy” movements. Haven’t you seen the news? Idiot. [401]
The overwhelming popularity of the top comment and the generally envious tone of many others not translated here seems to express a kind of longing for unity between the state’s interests and the people’s interests on behalf of the Chinese cyber-masses – perhaps a particularly Chinese-Communist-Confucian preoccupation. Only the last commenter (XBQ2010) made any consideration the convulsions of competing interests, mostly vested, often corrupt, and decidedly elite, underlying the American system.
The CCP has done great things for the Chinese people over the past 70-odd years, all the while emphasising that it has always fully represents the interests of the broad masses. Back in the mid-20th century the idea that politics could and should be that way – with the powerful and powerless united in purpose – was relatively compatible with the existing Confucian-imperial ideal of “great community” (da tong). But in the internet era, with great volumes of information making a myriad of fundamental conflicts of interest clear on a daily basis, this desire for a sense of unity between weak and strong, many and few, is proving impossible to satisfy.
southseaconversations 讨论南海 
China’s public response to the Mischief Reef FONOP
Posted: May 29, 2017 | Author: Andrew Chubb | Filed under: China-US, Comment threads, Global Times, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PLA & PLAN, South China Sea, State media, TV, Xinhua | Tags: CCP Propaganda Department, CCTV, China-US relations, Chinese foreign policy, Chinese internet, Chinese television, 环球时报, external propaganda, FONOPs, freedom of navigation, freedom of navigation patrols, Global Times, Hu Xijin, Huanqiu Shibao, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mischief Reef, online nationalism, Spratly, spratly islands, United States in South China Sea, US and South China Sea | 1 Comment“Unreasonable”: CCTV’s 10pm Evening News (晚间新闻) bulletin introduces the US FONOP near Mischief Reef, Thursday May 25, 2017.
Chinese media coverage of the recent US naval patrol near its outposts in the disputed Spratly Islands suggests, to me at least, Beijing’s increasing confidence in its handling of public opinion on this sensitive issue.
In turn, the content of some of Beijing’s publicity offers insight into China’s intentions for the handling of the matter going forward. Specifically, the government’s response suggests a firm determination to avoid escalating tensions. It could even foreshadow an increasingly tolerant attitude towards US assertions of freedom of navigation into the future.
The basis for this speculation is outlined below, but as always i’d encourage readers with other explanations to get in touch or leave a comment.
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