Peking University Professor Wang Yizhou, one of China’s top foreign policy scholars, did an interview for the excellent new Carnegie-Tsinghua podcast last month (Part 1 and Part 2), covering a very broad sweep of China’s emerging foreign policy, regional strategy, territorial disputes, global role, and bilateral relations with the US.
His main points are noted below, starting with regional strategy and China’s maritime territorial disputes. I’ve just done this as an exercise to try to better grasp the significance of what Wang says; for most people it’s probably better to just go listen to the podcast. The italicized blockquote bits are a mix of direct quotes and paraphrasing.
Xi’s task: a “soft landing” for the South China Sea dispute
In case i dont make it clear enough, a lot of what I write is speculative, my aim is to try understand these things as best I can, and I would really appreciate any alternative explanations, identification of shortcomings, points of disagreement, criticisms, biases identified, etc etc.
I am sure some of the interpretations I come up will turn out to be mistaken and/or incomplete, and although I hope some turn out to be right, it’s far from the end of the world if i’ve got it all wrong. It will be still have been worth the effort just to eliminate all those mistaken lines of thinking.
One idea i’ve been getting closer to ruling out is that Dai Xu and Luo Yuan aren’t serious PLA strategic thinkers. I think they are both propagandists and strategists. One sign is their publication in genuine journals like World Economics and Politics 《世界经济与政治》 (published by CASS), Contemporary International Relations 《现代国际关系》 (published by the MSS-affiliated CICIR), Contemporary World 《当代世界》 (CCP International Department), World Outlook 《国际展望》 (Shanghai Institute of International Relations), and Teaching and Research 《教育于研究》 (Renmin University).
While they are nominated as propaganda experts, they could still spend the bulk of their time in the world of thought rather than propaganda. Even Dai Xu, whose gigantic mass media output suggests he could probably spare little time for academic work, stated in 2009 that he does both internal and external work — that is, both thought 思想 and propaganda 宣传.
The difference between the two, as he said in his lecture to the PLAAF Political Academy in Shanghai, is that “in thought, anything goes, but propaganda has discipline”. This was, he said, the most important lesson he learned at the academy, his alma mater. There may be a large degree of crossover between Dai Xu Thought, and Dai Xu Propaganda — they may in fact be the same, except that the latter is presented and attenuated according to propaganda imperatives.
What follows, then, is something long overdue given the amount of attention i have focused on the propaganda side of Dai Xu and Luo Yuan’s work: a partial translation of an essay that i think may come close to representing what Dai Xu really thinks, as a strategist, on the South China Sea issue. It might not be pure thought…if there was such a thing, probably the only place it could reliably be identified would be in internal-circulation articles. But People’s Tribune Frontiers 《人民论坛.学术前沿》 appears a reputable (though recently-founded) CCP journal produced by the People’s Daily group, without any attempt at mass appeal, suggesting the audience would be mainly Party members and scholars, and perhaps soldiers and policymakers too. In other words, it could conceivably be part of the “internal work” that Dai says he does — Dai Xu Thought.
The article is titled ‘ “Attacking the Enemy before It is Fully Prepared”: A Petition for Changing South China Sea Strategy (“兵半渡可击”:南海战略万言书)’, and is freely available via a Hainan-based website called ‘Maritime Domain Online’ (海疆在线) that i suspect is run by the Hainan Maritime Security and Cooperation Institute that Dai Xu directs.
As the title suggests, Dai makes specific policy suggestions, based on a contention that China has a rapidly-closing “window of opportunity” to “resolve” the South China Sea issue, and should therefore act sooner rather than later. Notably, however, one of these suggestions is to call for the total demilitarization of the South China Sea’s disputed areas. He advocates “intensifying economic exploitation” but also “welcoming cooperation”. He argues China should rally round the nine-dash line and avoid any involvement of UNCLOS, but he also seems to advocate negotiations. Dai’s calls for military preparations and willingness to use force to back up the assertive actions he suggests, but his emphasis is on deterrence and willpower.
Big thanks to Xu Shaomin for suggesting the article.
Here is the abstract, followed by a translation of the section in which Dai makes his policy suggestions with some thoughts on those policies appended, and finally a brief consideration of some implications for the explanations i’ve recently offered for the public activities of PLA “hawks” like Dai.
By Dai Xu
People’s Tribune [Academic] Frontiers 《人民论坛－－学术前沿》
ABSTRACT: An indisputable fact is that China is facing unprecedented challenges presented by the South China Sea issue. The said issue has been internationalized, and will soon become a focus of international politics. The South China Sea is of great significance for China’s development and security. With the development of this issue, Vietnam will rise to be China’s major concern. To successfully resolve this issue, China needs to devise a “protracted war” strategy; use the current crisis as an opportunity for a shift in military strategy; set up an interdepartmental coordination committee; and materially change its current South China Sea policy.
Specific suggestions to resolve the South China Sea issue
|(1.) Institute determination to resolve the issue, and commence joint preparations in all areas. At present America is not ready and has not properly armed those small countries, and external powers like Japan have not substantively entered the dispute. China must seize and occupy the strategic heights of the future, and cannot let it become the Yellow Sea again.||
The idea of (1) gets to the heart of the paper’s debatable but nonetheless logically defensible premise: namely, that China has a 5-10 year “window of opportunity” while the US is bogged down in the Middle East.
I don’t really understand this Yellow Sea reference.
|(2.) Unite thinking, resolutely stick to the nine-dash line. The nine-dash line is the legal basis for China’s ownership of the Spratlys, and we absolutely cannot renounce it. We cannot make UNCLOS the main note of negotiations.||
The strong defence in of the nine-dashed line as “legal basis” of China’s claim in (2), and associated rejection of UNCLOS, is somewhat surprising, considering that elsewhere Dai is quite keen on transparency and clarity of intentions. Why not clarify the claim? China could continue to claim all the land features within the nine-dash line, and actually be in accordance with UNCLOS. China’s real reason for not clarifying may be that it would entail enforcement under Chinese law, which the CCP may not be keen to commit to at this point. If so, could this particular argument of Dai’s be aimed at maintaining morale, while avoiding that sort of dangerous bind?
|(3.) On the level of unified thinking, eliminate fear of America. Surveying US-Russian relations one can see that America respects strength. Russia halted the US [Cold War] strategic attack in Southeast Asia, and stopped the expansion of NATO beyond Ukraine and Georgia. We cannot say that [Deng/Jiang's doctrine of] “lying low 韬光养晦” is incorrect, but China is unaware of how to “loot a burning house 趁火打劫”. China must have an awareness of global strategic games. China should participate in South American affairs, the scramble for Arctic resources, Middle East affairs, African affairs, and force the US to encircle us all around the world, “saving Zhao by besieging Wei 围魏救赵”, thus reducing the pressure on our doorstep. Increase cooperation with Russia, cooperate on the Kurils issue to draw Japan northward, and weaken US military allies.||
The idea of causing headaches for the US around the world to relieve the pressure on China’s periphery, as set out in (3), employs a coherent (if somewhat unhealthy when viewed from outside) strategic logic.
I’m not going to pretend to know what’s best for China, but the multi-departmental group mentioned in (4) also seems to make sense.
|(4.) Establish a multi-departmental South China Sea coordination small group. The group would be jointly composed from the military, academia, State Oceanic Administration, Hainan Provincial Government, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It should change the situation of the MFA being under stress from dealing with the complicated South China Sea situation alone. It should coordinate all the departments relevant to the South China Sea.||
(4) contains a clear argument for reducing the MFA’s power in South China Sea policymaking, via an indirect but unmistakable criticism of both the prominence of the Foreign Ministry’s role, and the job it is doing. Dai’s apparent perception of the MFA as dominating South China Sea policy is in stark contrast to various foreign analysts who have written of the weakness of the MFA, fragmentation in China’s foreign policymaking, especially on maritime disputes.
|(5.) Major adjustment must be made to South China Sea policy, prioritizing [economic] exploitation . Since diplomacy being unable to resolve the issue, and our country is unwilling to go to war lightly, all that remains is to greatly intensify economic exploitation. Our country’s South China Sea policy should be adjusted to: sovereignty is ours, intensifying exploitation, welcoming cooperation, not fearing controversy, striking against provocation. Exploitation is central. In order to reduce the concerns of the international community, China’s exploitation should proceed with the primary objective of serving the world. For example, constructing an international shipping depot, and an international tourism and sightseeing spot. To this end, a South China Sea Special Zone should be established, as a maritime screen that also performs the functions of economic national defense 经济国防.||
Dai’s Hainan connections keep stacking up. It seems likely that he is to some extent speaking on behalf of the Hainan Provincial Government, especially with the strong advocacy of economic development projects in (5).
How novel is “economic national defense 经济国防“, meaning economic activities for national defense purposes, in the Chinese context and more broadly?
|(6.) Call on all countries’ militaries to withdraw from the South China Sea. Because Vietnam and the Philippines’ garrisoning of troops has affected regional shipping security, China should call for all countries to pull out their militaries simultaneously. This way, China can claim the moral high ground.||
Dai in (5) describes China being “unwilling” to go to war lightly as a “situation” that has left massive resource exploitation as the only option — which sounds like a (grudging?) admission that direct military action is off the policy table. Then in (6) he actually advocates the pullout of all military forces from the area, apparently including China’s.
|(7.) Prepare properly for war [with Vietnam]. China should, at the appropriate time, adjust its strategic focus, and conduct far-sighted and realistic research on the South China Sea. Make every kind of war preparation in the South China Sea area, especially for war-fighting 作战 against Vietnam. As soon as conflict commences, Vietnam’s facilities must be totally destroyed, and its ports blockaded.||
Dai is very harsh and provocative regarding Vietnam, for example in (7). What is Dai’s problem with Vietnam? Or could it be Hainan’s problem with Vietnam?
Enacting strategic containment of Vietnam is beneficial to the long-term stability of the South China Sea region, and also to improving our country’s overall security situation.
Implications for ‘Propaganda, Not Policy’
While some of these arguments may be attenuated from Dai’s mass media statements, he really does appear to be attempting to pushing for policy change in the South China Sea, which at a glance spells trouble for the ‘Propaganda, Not Policy’ explanation i’ve been proposing. Yet, contrary to what some angry military enthusiasts assume, the Propaganda Not Policy argument does not necessarily imply Dai Xu doesn’t mean what he says. He may mean most or all of what he says publicly, but he only says it if and when it accords with the priorities of his superiors in the military propaganda system.
Alternatively, considering the likely target audience of the People’s Tribune Frontiers, an article such as this could be aimed at the masses of cadres, officers and possibly soldiers. David Cohen discussed in the most recent China Brief how the constitutionalism debate could be intended to rally cadres to be vigilant and toe the line. It’s plausible that this has a similar intent.
What’s different about this is that it has been published in a forum for genuine scholarly debate over policy, rather than a mass medium. Perhaps all that is certain about this possible piece of Dai Xu Thought, is that he was attempting to influence the Party and academic policy debate within China. Whether the ultimate aim of that was to institute the specific policy actions, or to shift the mindset of the readers — such as by raising the vigilance of cadres and perhaps soldiers – is unclear to me. What do you think, Dear Reader? What are the other possibilities that i’m overlooking?
 Other notable titles that Luo and/or Dai have been published in include Party & Government Forum 《党政干部文摘》 (Shanghai and Central Party School versions), World Affairs 《世界知识》 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Contemporary Military Digest 《当代军事文摘》 (PLA Publishing House), Aerospace Knowledge 《航空知识》 (China Aviation Society). Found using CNKI database.
 I’m going to leave out the “external” from the “external propaganda expert” title, as it risks confusing the issue. Military external propaganda, as noted here, is not just about foreigners, and in fact may be overwhelmingly domestically directed, even as it serves international goals of public opinion warfare.
 Unless he has a team of ghost writers…?! His book publishing, however, has indeed slowed down in recent years.
 Can anyone enlighten me as to the People’s Tribune (Frontiers) target readership and/or purposes?
 Sovereignty over merely the largest two or three of the Spratlys — those with fresh water and therefore at least arguably inhabitable — would generate exclusive economic rights covering most of the area within the nine-dash line.
 开发, aka “development”.
[Updated 16 Jan 3.45pm BST]
On Tuesday afternoon the Chinese online media, led by Huanqiu Wang (Global Times Net), started reporting, “Japan official explicitly states for first time that warning shots will be fired at Chinese planes“.
HQW’s reporter Wang Huan 王欢 quoted the Asahi Shimbun website quoting Defense Minister Onodera, when asked about warning shots, replying that “any country would make this response if its airspace was intruded upon”.
Onodera’s comment may well have been coaxed out of him by reporters looking for a juicy headline, as it comes across as a contradiction of Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga’s comment last week as reported by CNS (the other Xinhua) as reported by CNS that there were no plans for firing warning shots.
According to the Chinese internet media headlines that have relayed the story, Suga “denied” 否认 plans to fire warning shots, but now Onodera has “explicitly confirmed” 明确表态 that they will occur.
The news that Japan “will fire warning shots” was still the top splash on HQW’s website more than 12 hours later:
Whether Onodera’s statement has been reported accurately or not, the result is that the Diaoyu ball game now rests with the PRC, and the party-state is playing on a big-time court with a packed house looking on.
Last week the New York Times ran a story on how Ling Jihua’s attempt to cover up his son’s death in that Ferrari crash may have severely weakened Hu Jintao’s position during this year’s CCP leadership transition.
It might just be me and my island-centricness, but this story certainly didn’t seem to be following the inverted-pyramid rule, for only those readers who persisted to the very last paragraph (or read the Sinocism China Newsletter) would have learned that:
By September, party insiders said, Mr. Hu was so strained by the Ling affair and the leadership negotiations that he seemed resigned to yielding power. As Mr. Hu’s influence faded, Mr. Xi began taking charge of military affairs, including a group coordinating China’s response to the escalating row with Japan over disputed islands.
Given both the vital role Ling had played in managing the logistics of the General Secretary’s day-to-day activities, and the likely emotional toll of the death of a close associate’s son, this idea of a Human Jintao feeling the pinch is logical enough.
Although the Times‘ sources say Ling’s replacement as CCP General Office Director, Li Zhanshu, arrived in July, the public announcement of Ling’s reassignment from the post was only made on September 1. Then Noda reached his agreement with the Kurihara family to make the purchase on September 4. Could all this explain Xi Jinping’s lack of a public appearance between September 2 and September 12? If i were gearing up to take over as CCP General Secretary in a few months’ time and then found myself taking charge of the country’s response to a rapidly-escalating crisis, i’d have trouble finding time for photo ops.
In last week’s Sinica Podcast, M. Taylor Fravel discussed the March 1988 Sino-Vietnamese battle in the Spratly Islands, recounting how the PLAN Commander was moved from his post afterwards as a result of his unauthorized decision to open fire on the Vietnamese Navy.
This could make the 1988 battle appear as a historical example of uncoordination in the PRC’s behaviour towards the outside world — a rogue commander taking foreign policy into his own hands. However, the decision to send the Navy in to establish a presence on unoccupied reefs in the Spratlys was a centralized, high-level one.
Today, the Chinese Navy is better equipped and better trained, so the chances of something similar happening are small. The unwavering non-involvement of the PLAN in China’s maritime territorial disputes, even as tensions have risen to boiling point, is a testament to the navy’s professionalization, and a site of consensus among China’s policymakers. The US Department of Defense in 2011 presciently pinpointed (see p.60) the increasing use of non-military law enforcement agencies to press China’s claims in disputed waters as an important component of PRC policy. Since then, this approach has become ever-more salient.
China’s maritime law enforcement fleets have long been seen as a source of policy disorganization, both within China and abroad; back in 2002, for example, the Hainan Provincial NPC delegation tabled a motion to establish a unified maritime law-enforcement fleet.
But in the podcast Fravel drew attention to how this year the China Maritime Surveillance and Fisheries Law Enforcement fleets have actually coordinated rather well, both with each other and with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in advancing China’s maritime claims.
“The headline speaks to the Chinese people’s heart!”: Zhong Sheng on Diaoyu patrols, gets a Phoenix twistPosted: October 10, 2012
Monday’s “Zhong Sheng” article in the Renmin Ribao set out to tell the world that the People’s Republic’s fisheries and surveillance ships are going to continue their patrols around the Diaoyu Islands.
The basic point was simple (official English translation):
Not only will the ship fleet of the Chinese Fishery Administration continue to stand its ground, but the Chinese Marine Surveillance ships will also stand their ground.
Beginning October 1, Chinese government boats have entered the 12nm territorial zone twice (on October 2 and 3) and patrolled in the 12nm “contiguous zone” every day since then. Zhong Sheng offered an explanation of sorts for the timing:
China needs to stand its ground in this manner. Otherwise, China’s territorial sovereignty and legitimate right and interest could never be truly maintained, and Chinese people wouldn’t be able to celebrate the festive season securely and happily.
So the patrols recorded each day from October 1 to 7 were probably aimed in part at giving China’s holidaying families a sense that their government taking the requisite action to protect the homeland during National Day Golden Week. The Japanese media were of course crucial to the effectiveness of this.(†)
“Zhong Sheng” repeatedly claimed that the patrols were regularized and would not go away, but in so doing, effectively admitted that China had changed the status quo on the waters out there: “Japan is not accustomed to this . . . Japan must learn to adapt to these regular actions of China.” In fact, the writer(s) even went one step further in this direction, nominating the specific date for one significant change in PRC policy:
The Chinese Fishery Administration has normalized the fishery-protection patrol in the waters near the Diaoyu Islands and its subsidiary islands since as early as 2010.
Translating the following profile on Luo Yuan led to an extremely stimulating discussion with a Chinese friend last night on the topic of this so-called “Major-General”. My friend sees the Luo Yuan media phenomenon as serving an important purpose for the central government: Luo basically acts as a layer of interference between the decision-makers and outside observers.
Among the various possibilities raised in the previous article on Luo Yuan, then, this explanation implies that his prominence in the media is very much a result of consensus at the top of both the military and the party that it is beneficial to have a hardline attack dog. The logic is strong: official-ish voices, those of like Luo and other hawkish paramilitary figures such as Major-General Zhang Zhaozhong of National Defense University, add a layer of unpredictability to Chinese foreign policy, a la North Korea’s antics.
My friend dismisses the idea that Luo Yuan could represent any kind of policy faction or alliance within the party or military; Luo has no influence of his own, he argues, and no genuine policy player would agree with him. The implication of this is that no-one in a position of power in China would actually want to act aggressively on the South China Sea issue. The players in the decision-making process, whoever they are, including military leaders, are much too rational to entertain such ideas.
The bigger picture that starts to take shape is one in which the China Threat Theory is actually something that the Chinese government wants, and perhaps even needs, in order to hide its soft underbelly.
Although the party-state’s approach to the South China Sea disputes is often publicly criticised in China as weak-kneed, my friend places this approach among the government’s continuous, long-term policies that are not subject to internal competition or debate. We can certainly discern a pattern of opportunism in China’s actual actions in the South China Sea, from the taking of the Paracels from South Vietnamese remnants in 1974, to the 1988 battle with Vietnam over the Union Atolls in the Spratlys as Vietnam’s backer the Soviet Union began to crumble, to the occupation of Mischief Reef in 1995 in the wake of the US’s departure from the Philippines.
However, the question might be asked: if China is so rational on the South China Sea issue, why did it alienate its neighbours and draw the US in by stepping up its presence in 2009-2011? Well, Michael Swaine & M. Taylor Fravel have shown, convincingly in my view, that China’s alleged assertiveness, or aggressiveness (or even “aggressive assertiveness“!) during that period was largely explainable as a series of responses to the actions of rival claimant states, mainly Vietnam and the Philippines.
That still leaves the question of Luo Yuan as an opinion leader in Chinese society. My friend’s reading of the situation suggests that the CCP is so confident of its control of domestic nationalist opinion that it doesn’t feel like it’s playing with fire at all when it allows mass outpourings of support for Luo and criticism of the policy status quo online. This confidence was especially apparent in July last year when China agreed to the Guidelines for the Implementation of the South China Sea DOC, inevitably causing nationalist outrage online.
Regarding the popular online support for Luo’s views, my friend puts this down to simple venting. Indeed, the article translated below suggests that the Chinese people just want to see someone in the military express hardline views, and want to believe that someone in power agrees with them. Nevertheless, he sees the allowing or facilitating of Luo Yuan’s media profile as primarily an externally-directed tactic.
So perhaps the CCP trusts that the public, on the whole, really doesn’t agree with Luo’s standpoints. I will be testing this idea through some offline opinion polling later this year – a likely finding of little support for stronger action in the South China Sea among everyday people, would support this conclusion. (This would be exactly the opposite of prominent US scholar Susan Shirk’s claim that the leadership feels threatened by a madly nationalistic public.) After all, a tiny fraction of the population can make a lot of noise online, as many of the South Sea conversations documented here illustrate.
So in sum, Luo Yuan’s media presence, and the provocative media coverage of the Scarborough Shoal standoff that i mused about here last week, could all be part of the same strategy of disinformation for the outside world: let guys like Luo Yuan rant, let the Chinese media make him seem credible, and let the internet users provide “evidence” that the Chinese people are angry about the South Sea and demanding tougher actions, when in fact they are apathetic, and tougher actions are not on the policy agenda.
This is basically a full inversion of the idea of China’s domestic situation dictating China’s foreign policy; instead, the domestic situation is being manipulated and used to China’s advantage at the international negotiating table. It suggests a broader and deeper application of the principles of the “strategic logic of anti-foreign protest” – aka the nationalism card.
The following profile on Luo Yuan, from the April 9 edition of Southern Window, gives the impression of an angry, impotent, and even confused Luo Yuan fighting an unwinnable battle against China’s moral decay. And despite his princeling background, he doesn’t appear to particularly well connected either.
Note: the translation is a summary one in some parts, but mostly it is sentence-by-sentence.
Zhang Jianfeng, Southern Weekend
The writer likens the courtyard at the Chinese Academy of Military Science to a “freeze-frame” scene. Luo Yuan sums up the peace and quiet as the site of “a battle without smoke, and a place for pre-practice of war, of concealed dragons and crouching tigers”. Some people deride the Chinese Academy of Military Science as being on the sideilnes, but Luo Yuan quotes a Deng Tuo poem on the ability of writers to cause bloodshed.
“Comfortable with their mistresses, the leaders haven’t gotten out of bed”: perplexing Chinese media coverage of the Scarborough standoffPosted: April 26, 2012
It’s one of the great puzzles of Chinese foreign policy in the 21st century, and particularly when it comes to the PRC’s behaviour in the South China Sea: which of China’s actions are co-ordinated, intentional, directed by the central leadership – and which are the result of individual agencies, political factions, and other actors in competition for resources or policy supremacy?
The International Crisis Group released a report on Monday this week emphasising the former, the “lack of coordination among Chinese government agencies” leading to an incoherent policy on the South China Sea. The same day, James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara of the US Naval War College published a piece that argued China’s “small-stick diplomacy” strategy in the dispute – principally the use of civilian maritime law enforcement agencies – is likely to succeed.
One of the problems is there are very limited ways of working out what’s actually going on, and one of the principal windows we do have is the Chinese mass media, including online media like news portals, the content of which we know to be shaped by the directives of the State Council Information Office and Ministry(s) of Propaganda. However, the Chinese mass media also operate to a large degree on commercial premises, so it’s a constant challenge to work out whether their coverage is best explained by sensationalism or political direction.
Watching the PRC’s media coverage of the Scarborough Shoal standoff over the past couple of weeks has been nothing short of bewildering. In one particularly strange example this week, the China Youth Daily, online news portals, and decision-makers combined to create a veritable firestorm of outrage against the government – all based on what appear to be false reporting.